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Case No. 20090471-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Timothy Lamoreaux, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for distribution or arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance in a drug-free zone. This Court has jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting the officer's testimony where the 
record shows it was of his independent recollection of Defendant's admission to 
arranging to distribute methamphetamine and not hearsay? 
Standard of Review. "The determination of whether evidence constitutes 
hearsay is a question of law that we review for correctness." Prosper, Inc. v. 
Department of Workforce Services, 2007 UT App 281, |8,168 P.3d 344 (citing State v. 
Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1993)). 
RULES 
The following rules are attached at Addendum A: 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rules 612,801,802; 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 30. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of distribution of or arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance in a drug-free zone, a first degree felony, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §58-37-8(1)(a)(ii)(2004). R091. A jury convicted 
Defendant. R129; 193:55. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a statutory five-to-
life term in the Utah State Prison with a recommendation that he serve the least 
amount of time possible under the law. R176. Defendant timely appealed. R182. 
The Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court. R186. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Testimony of Officer Shane Sorensen 
On the evening of July 1,2008, just before 10:00 p.m., Provo City Police Officer 
Shane Sorensen responded to a call from an apartment complex owner. Rl92:60,62, 
67. The caller reported that a car was illegally parked across the street and there was 
"other activity/' Id. at 62-63. Officer Sorensen could not locate the reported vehicle, 
but in crossing the street, he came upon a gray car occupied by three adults and a 
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one to two-year-old child. Id. at 63-64,66. Suzanne Ruesch was later identified as 
the owner and driver and Amber Coutts as one of the adult passengers. Id. at 65-66. 
The officer also observed one man at the passenger side of the car and Defendant at 
the driver's side. Id. at 64-65. As he approached, Officer Sorensen saw Defendant 
hand Ms. Ruesch something. Id. at 67. Concerned for his safety, the officer directed 
both men to the rear of the car, where he could keep an eye on them. Id. at 67-68. 
He spoke with Ms. Ruesch, who admitted that there was methamphetamine in the 
car, placed there by Defendant. Id. at 69-70. Based on this statement and Ms. 
Ruesch's consent, Officer Sorensen searched the car. Id. at 70, 126. Behind the 
passenger's seat, he found a black bag. Id. at 70. Within the bag, there were "a lot" 
of small baggies, a cigarette container containing three baggies of what he believed 
to be "a large amount of methamphetamine," and other paraphernalia, including a 
digital scale. Id. at 70-72, 76. A Utah State Crime Lab chemist later confirmed the 
substance to be methamphetamine, which weighed, in total, 16.2 grams. Rl92:96-97. 
Based on the large amount of methamphetamine in the three baggies, the 
paraphernalia, and Defendant's having handed something to Ms. Ruesch, Officer 
Sorensen initially suspected that only Defendant was distributing 
methamphetamine. Id. at 71-72, 75f 77. Accordingly, Officer Sorensen arrested 
Defendant and gave him Miranda warnings. Id. at 68,78. Defendant initially denied 
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any involvement with the methamphetamine. Id. at 78. The officer then 
interviewed Ms. Ruesch and, based on that exchange, also arrested her and Ms. 
Courts. Id. at 77-78. 
Officer Sorensen transported Defendant, Ms. Ruesch, and Ms. Coutts to the 
Utah County Jail. Id. at 78-79. There, after again denying his involvement, 
"eventually [Defendant] did make some incriminating statements/' Id. at 79-80. 
When asked to describe what Defendant said, Officer Sorensen began by saying, 
"according to my report/' but then asked, for the first time, if he could refer to his 
report. Id. at 80. In response, the prosecutor cautioned the officer, "You can refer to 
it to refresh your memory, but please don't read from it." Id. at 81. Officer Sorensen 
then testified, "Okay. He did admit that he was involved in making the 
arrangements to distribute methamphetamine," although the officer acknowledged 
that Defendant "probably did not use those specific words." Id. When again asked 
if he recalled "roughly" what Defendant had said, Officer Sorensen answered, "To -
to be honest, to the best of my recollection, I - I can't recall his specific words, 
exactly what he said." Id. When then asked how Defendant indicated he had been 
involved, Officer Sorensen stated, "He - eventually said, 'Yeah, you know, I - you're 
right.'" Id. Defendant further acknowledged that he had been on his cell phone to 
Ms. Ruesch. Id. Asked to explain Defendant's purpose in calling Ms. Ruesch, the 
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officer asked again if he could refer to his report, but could not find a specific 
reference within the report. Id. at 81-82. And when further questioned, Officer 
Sorensen did not think that Defendant actually told him what the substance of his 
conversation with Ms. Ruesch was. Id. at 82. 
The prosecutor then asked Officer Sorensen what Defendant had said that 
indicated to the officer that Defendant had been involved in a drug deal. Id. at 82. 
Officer Sorensen asked, "Can I refer to my report and read that specifically?" Id. at 
83. At that point, the trial court interjected, "Well, it depends on whether or not 
there's an objection. Because he can utilize it for the purpose of refreshing his 
memory." Id. Defense counsel then objected, asserting that he believed that the 
officer had read the report, that it did not appear that he had an independent 
memory of Defendant's specific statement of his involvement, and that to read the 
report into the record would improperly allow the admission of hearsay. Id. The 
court disagreed, stating that the officer had first to be asked if the report did refresh 
his memory. Id. If it did, the court stated, the officer "could make reference to it." 
Id. If it did not, the court stated, "he has no independent recollection as it relates to 
[the specific statement] and the objection would be sustained." Id. 
The prosecutor then asked Officer Sorensen, "Does that report refresh your 
memory about what Mr. Lamoreaux said to you that night?" Id. Officer Sorensen 
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answered, "To be honest, no, it doesn't/7 Id, The prosecutor immediately asked, 
"Okay. Did Mr. Lamoreaux say anything about why he changed his stories, from 
initially denying any involvement and then admitting to you that he was involved?" 
Id, Officer Sorensen answered, "Not that I recall." Id, At that point, the direct 
examination of the officer ended. Id, at 84. 
Testimony of Suzanne Ruesch 
Ms. Ruesch testified on behalf of the State. R192:103,107. In connection with 
the events on July 1,2008. She was charged with distribution of methamphetamine, 
a first degree felony, and with possession of methamphetamine and paraphernalia. 
Id, at 105-06. She pleaded guilty to distribution, reduced to a second degree felony 
and she admitted that she pled because she was indeed guilty. Id, at 105-07. 
Ms. Ruesch had "h[u]ng out" with Defendant ten years earlier, but she had 
not seen him for some time. Id. at 104. The day before July 1,2008, Defendant called 
her and requested that she "pick up some dope" — specifically, methamphetamine. 
Id, at 107-108. The next day, as Ms. Ruesch drove with her friend, Amber Courts, 
Defendant called Ms. Ruesch at least three times. Id. at 108-110,112-13. Following 
Defendant's instructions, Ms. Ruesch picked up a quantity of methamphetamine in 
Sandy, Utah, and, using scales to weigh out specific amounts of the drug, made 
deliveries at the Best Motel in Utah County. Id, at 110-12. Ms. Ruesch then drove to 
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her daughter's house, where she was greeted by her daughter with her eight-month-
old grandson, and, according to plan, she was to meet up with Defendant. Id. at 
112-14. As Ms. Ruesch was about to leave, Defendant appeared. Id. at 112. 
Defendant was accompanied by her grandson's father. Id. at 118. Defendant 
was talking on his phone as he approached the driver's side of Ms. Ruesch's car. Id. 
at 112. He asked Ms. Ruesch if she had "a teener" — a small quantity of drugs — but 
because Defendant was "acting really weird," she told him that she did not have 
any drugs. Id. at 114. Defendant nevertheless handed Ms. Ruesch his phone to 
speak with a prospective buyer, but she immediately returned it to him when the 
caller hung up. Id. 114-17. An instant later, Defendant threw his phone and his 
black bag into the car as Ms. Ruesch heard the words, "Freeze, put your hands in 
the air." Id. at 117. 
Trial court's refusal to strike the officer's testimony 
At the conclusion of Ms. Ruesch's testimony, Defendant moved for a directed 
verdict. R192:133. In support of the motion, Defendant moved to strike "any 
testimony from the officer relative to [his] confession" because the officer "had no 
recollection of what was said," "reading the police report did not refresh his 
memory, and he was not able to provide any testimony . . . independent from the 
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police report as to what he independently recollected was said by my client/7 Id. 
Therefore, Defendant argued, the report was inadmissible hearsay. Id. 
The trial court denied the motion to strike. Id. at 134. The court agreed with 
the prosecutor, who stated that " Officer Sorensen stated very directly that his 
memory was that [Defendant] admitted being involved in the arranging and 
distribution of [methamphetamine]." Id. at 133,136-37. The court further expanded 
that "[the officer] could not state with any specificity the exact language that was 
stated by [Defendant], even upon referral to his police report." Id. at 137. 
Thereafter, the court denied the motion for directed verdict. Id. at 140. 
Before closing argument, Defendant again returned to Officer Sorensen's 
testimony, asserting that, because he referred to his report while testifying, Officer 
Sorensen's testimony did not reflect an independent recollection that Defendant had 
admitted his involvement in arranging to distribute methamphetamine. R193:8-9. 
According to Defendant, the jury therefore should not be allowed to consider that 
part of Officer Sorensen's testimony. Id. 
The prosecutor disagreed: "I believe [the officer's] testimony was that he did 
have an independent recollection of the Defendant incriminating himself, but he 
was not able to recall with that independent recollection specific details about the 
language the Defendant used. Id. The trial court stated, "That's my understanding. 
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. . ." Id. The prosecutor further argued that, at the moment Defendant was referring 
to, Officer Sorensen was not reading from his report, and that review of the police 
report would show "there is no statement in the report that [Defendant] admitted to 
being involved in arranging to distribute methamphetamine." Id. at 9. 
The trial court again refused to exclude the officer's challenged testimony, 
ruling that Defendant might comment on his impressions of how the officer 
testified, but that "I do have an independent recollection of how he testified 
yesterday. And I think it just goes to the weight/' Id. at 9. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in overruling his hearsay objection 
to Officer Sorensen's testimony that Defendant admitted involvement in the crime 
for which he was convicted. In asserting his claim, however, Defendant entirely 
disregards the trial court's finding that the officer testified on that issue from his 
independent recollection. Moreover, Defendant fails to marshal all the record 
evidence supporting the trial court's finding. Thus, Defendant's claim fails 
Any error in admitting the officer's testimony was harmless. The officer 
testified, without objection, as to Defendant's suspicious conduct and to his female 
accomplice's admission that Defendant placed methamphetamine in her car. A 
consensual search of the car uncovered methamphetamine and paraphernalia. The 
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accomplice pleaded guilty to distribution, forthrightly admitted her guilt, and 
provided details of Defendant's direction to pick up and distribute 
methamphetamine. Thus, additional substantial evidence supported Defendant's 
guilt for distribution or arranging to distribute methamphetamine. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING THE 
OFFICER'S TESTIMONY WHERE THE RECORD SHOWS THE 
OFFICER TESTIFIED FROM HIS INDEPENDENT 
RECOLLECTION OF DEFENDANT'S ADMISSION TO 
ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE METHAMPHETAMINE 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in not "eMine! an instruction to 
the jury stating that Officer Sorensen's testimony that the Defendant had confessed 
should not have been considered/' Aplt. Br. at 5. He argues that 
Officer Sorensen's testimony was inadmissible hearsay as it was apparent from the 
witness's own statement that he was transmitting to the jury the contents of his 
report and not the contents of his memory [—i.e., his independent recollection]/' 
Aplt. Br. at 5 
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A. Defendant's claim disregards the trial court's findings and is 
unsupported by the record. 
"Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules/' 
UTAH R. EVID. 802.! Rule 612, Utah Rules of Evidence, however, provides for the 
refreshing of recollection without regard for the admissibility of the memory 
refreshing object. See 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGERET A. BERGER WEINSTEIN'S 
EVIDENCE f 612:14-15 (1994) ("Anything may be used to revive memory.... The aid 
to memory need not be admissible in evidence/') Thus, even hearsay may be used 
to aid a witness's memory if it refreshes his independent recollection of the matter 
under inquiry. 
Defendant seizes on a corollary to this last rule: "[B]ut where a document is 
excluded from admission because hearsay, the contents thereof cannot be got in 
evidence under the pretext of refreshing a recollection/' S.W. Bridges & Co. v. 
Candland, 88 Utah 373, 54 P.2d 842, 847 (1936). And "[refreshing a recollection is 
not equivalent to reading from a document." Id. He argues that the trial court 
"exercised no care to see that the report was being used for the limited function of 
starting the recollective process, exemplified by the officer's reference to the report 
1
 "'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted." UTAH R. EVID. 801(c). 
11 
"throughout the entirety of his testimony" without oversight by the court. Aplt. Br. 
at 7. In so argumg, Defendant assumes that the officer simply read from his report 
and that the trial court simply acquiesced in that impropriety. Defendant's 
argument, however, completely disregards the trial court's findings and the 
supporting record. 
"A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that 
supports the challenged finding." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); State v. Chavez-Espinoza, 
2008 UT App 191, f 7,186 P.3d 1023 ("[I]n order to challenge a trial court's factual 
findings, a party must marshal all the evidence in favor of the very findings they 
oppose on appeal."), cert, denied, 199 P.3d 367 (Utah 2008). This means that the party 
must "marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that 
despite this evidence, the [trial] court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 
against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous." In re 
A.B., 2007 UT App 286, If 13, 168 P.3d 820. "Where a party fails to meet the 
marshaling requirement, [this Court] generally will assume that the evidence on 
record adequately supports the trial court's findings." Id. at f^ 20 (citation omitted). 
In this case, Defendant does not mention the trial court's findings, marshal 
any evidence in support of those findings related to Officer Sorensen's testimony, 
marshal any evidence in support of those findings or make any effort to show that 
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those findings are clearly erroneous. Defendant, therefore, has failed to meet his 
marshaling requirement, and this Court should decline to consider Defendant's 
claim. In any case, the claim is without merit. 
In denying Defendant's motion to strike Officer Sorensen's testimony, the trial 
court made the following findings: 
My recollection as it relates to the admission is as follows. [The 
officer] had no recollection of the exact wording that [Defendant] said 
in connection with it, but he had made - - the officer had made some 
statement as it relates to his involvement. And his testimony was that 
[Defendant] finally said "Right" or "Correct." There was an admission as 
it relates to tlie statement oftlie officer relative to [Defendant's involvement 
with tlie drugs. [Emphasis added.] 
r\ 
Rl92:134. The court expanded that" [the officer] could not state with any specificity 
the exact language that was stated by [Defendant], even upon referral to his police 
report." Id. at 137. Before closing argument, when Defendant again sought to keep 
the officer's statement from the jury, the court reiterated its finding by again 
adopting the prosecutor's view. Id. at 193:8. The prosecutor stated, "I believe [the 
officer's] testimony was that he did have an independent recollection of the 
Defendant incriminating himself, but he was not able to recall with that 
1 r-w-rf 
The entire record surrounding the officer's challenged testimony is attached 
at Addendum B. The record of the trial court's findings is attached at Addendum C. 
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independent recollection specific details about the language the Defendant used. Id. 
The trial court stated, "That's my understanding " Id. 
The record, which Defendant fails to marshal, supports the trial court's 
findings. Officer Sorensen testified that "[Defendant] did make some incriminating 
statements" during the officer's exchange with Defendant at the police station, 
without reference to his police report Id. at 79-80. Only when then asked to 
describe what Defendant said did the officer ask to refer to his report. Id. at 80. In 
response, the prosecutor cautioned the officer, "You can refer to it to refresh your 
memory, but please don't read from it." Id. at 81. After referring to the report, 
Officer Sorensen reaffirmed Defendant's admission of his involvement in 
distribution of methamphetamine, although the officer acknowledged that 
Defendant "probably did not use those specific words." Id. When then asked how 
Defendant indicated he had been involved, Officer Sorensen stated, without 
reference to the report, "He - eventually said, 'Yeah, you know, I - you're right.'" 
Id. When further queried about what precisely Defendant had said, the officer 
repeatedly and forthrightly admitted that he could not recall the specifics of 
Defendant's admission, even when he referred to the report: "To — to be honest, to 
the best of my recollection, I -1 can't recall his specific words, exactly what he said." 
Id. at 81-83. Finally, when the prosecutor argued that Officer Sorensen was not 
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reading from his report, he asserted that review of the police report would show 
"there is no statement in the report that [Defendant] admitted to being involved in 
arranging to distribute methamphetamine./, R193:9. Defendant neither objected to 
this assertion nor did he move for a new trial to show that his admission did appear 
in the report. And on appeal, Defendant makes no attempt to rebut the prosecutor's 
argument that the officer could not have been reading the crucial admission because 
it did not appear in the report. 
Thus, the trial court's findings and the record show that Officer Sorensen, 
after reviewing his report, had an independent recollection that Defendant had 
made an incriminating admission of his involvement in drug distribution. Stated 
differently, the findings and the record support that Officer Sorensen's testimony 
was not the result of his having read the admission from the report, but that report 
refreshed his memory as to Defendant's admission of guilt generally, even while it 
failed to refresh his memory as to Defendant's specific words. Thus, the trial court 
did not err in rejecting Defendant's hearsay objection to Officer Sorensen's 
testimony. 
Finally, the record rebuts Defendant's contention that the trial court 
"exercised no care to see that the report was being used for the limited function of 
starting the recollective process. Aplt. Br. at 7. At the point Officer Sorensen gave 
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his crucial testimony that Defendant admitted he was involved in arranging to 
distribute methamphetamine, the prosecutor cautioned the officer not to read from 
his report. R192.79-81. As discussed, the trial court later found and record supports 
that the officer was not then reading from his report and that, when asked, he 
candidly testified that the report did not refresh his recollection as to Defendant's 
specific words. Id. at 79-81. When the prosecutor then pressed Officer Sorensen 
further as to what Defendant had actually said, the officer asked, "Can I refer to my 
report and read that specifically?" Id. at 82-83. At that point, the trial court 
interjected, "Well, it depends on whether or not there's an objection. Because he can 
utilize it for the purpose of refreshing his memory." Id. at 83. Defendant objected 
on the ground that the officer had read the report into the record and that his 
testimony was therefore hearsay. Id. The court disagreed, stating that the officer 
had first to be asked if the report did refresh his memory. Id. If it did, the court 
stated, the officer "could make reference to it." Id. If it did not, the court stated, "he 
has no independent recollection as it relates to [Defendant's specific statement] and 
the objection would be sustained." Id. The prosecutor then asked Officer Sorensen, 
"Does that report refresh your memory about what Mr. Lamoreaux said to you that 
night?" Id. Officer Sorensen answered, "To be honest, no, it doesn't." Id. This 
recounting of the proceedings shows that the court carefully tracked the way Officer 
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Sorensen's testimony came in and deliberately directed a procedure that ensured 
that his testimony would not constitute inadmissible hearsay. 
In sum, Defendant fails to show that the trial court erred in allowing into 
evidence inadmissible hearsay of his admission to being involved in arranging to 
distribute methamphetamine. Moreover, even if error occurred, the error was 
harmless. 
B. Any error in admitting the officer's testimony was harmless in 
light of the additional substantial evidence of Defendant's guilt. 
"[H] armless error is an error that is sufficiently inconsequential that there is 
no reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome of the proceedings. Put 
differently, an error is harmful only if the likelihood of a different outcome is 
sufficiently high that it undermines our confidence in the verdict." State v. Evans, 
2001UT 22,1 20,20 P.3d 888 (citation omitted); see also UTAH R. CRIM. P. 30(a) ("Any 
error, defect, irregularity [,] or variance which does not affect the substantial rights of 
a party shall be disregarded/7) 
Even if the trial court erred in admitting Officer Sorensen's testimony of his 
incriminating admission, there was other substantial evidence to support 
Defendant's conviction of distribution of or arranging to distribute 
methamphetamine. Officer Sorensen testified, without objection, that when he 
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approached Ms. Ruesch's car he saw hand Ms. Ruesch something. R192:67. Ms. 
Ruesch admitted that there was methamphetamine in the car, placed there by 
Defendant. Id. at 69-70. A consensual search of the car revealed a black bag 
containing paraphernalia and a large amount of methamphetamine. Id. at 69-72,76. 
Ms. Ruesch, who pleaded guilty to distribution of methamphetamine and freely 
acknowledged her guilt, testified that Defendant repeatedly called her and to 
arrange for her to pick specific quantities of methamphetamine, which she then 
distributed. Id. at 105-10,112-13. This evidence was more than ample to support 
Defendant's conviction. Thus, even if the trial court erred in admitting Officer 
Sorensen's challenged testimony, the error was harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's conviction. 
Respectfully submitted April 2L, 2010. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Ajtteyney General ^~ 
KENNETH A. B&dNstoN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Addendum A 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rule 612. Writing used to refresh memory 
If a witness uses a writing to refresh the witness' memory for the purpose of testifying, 
either 
(1) while testifying, or 
(2) before testifying, if the court in its discretion determines it is necessary in the interests 
of justice, 
an adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing, to inspect it, to 
cross-examine the witness thereon, and to introduce in evidence those portions which 
relate to the testimony of the witness. If it is claimed that the writing contains matters not 
related to the subject matter of the testimony the court shall examine the writing in 
camera, excise any portions not so related, and order delivery of the remainder to the 
party entitled thereto. Any portion withheld over objections shall be preserved and made 
available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. If a writing is not produced or 
delivered pursuant to order under this rule, the court shall make any order justice 
requires, except that in criminal cases when the prosecution elects not to comply, the 
order shall be one striking the testimony or, if the court in its discretion determines that 
the interests of justice so require, declaring a mistrial. 
[Amended effective October 1, 1992.] 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rule 801. Hearsay - Definitions 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct 
of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted. 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject 
to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is (A) inconsistent with 
the declarant's testimony or the witness denies having made the statement or has 
forgotten, or (B) consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an 
express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper 
influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the 
person; or 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is (A) the 
party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a 
statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a 
statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject, 
or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of 
the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a 
statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy. 
[Amended effective October 1, 1992.] 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rule 802. Hearsay rule 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 30. Errors and Defects 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial rights 
of a party shall be disregarded. 
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors in the 
record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time and 
after such notice, if any, as the court may order. 
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County Jail? 
A They were all taken to the Utah County Jail. 
Q And did you speak with them again at the jail? 
A I did. I spoke with all three. 
Q Okay. Let's talk about your discussion with 
Mr. Lamoreaux while you were at the jail. Where were you when 
you had that discussion? 
A I was at the booking desk, which is if you go into 
the jail, you go into the sally port, you go in the front door, 
there's several computers there where -- that we use in order 
to put the information in on each individual that's brought 
into the jail. He was actually sitting right next to me at the 
time. I was at the computer. He wasn't more than three, 
four -- three feet at the most from where I was next to the 
computer. 
Q Okay. And what did you say to him? 
A At that point I was talking to him just like a friend 
or friends would talk to each other, having a conversation 
about the situation and circumstances. I tried to tell him 
based on the information that I had gained from the people that 
he was involved with, that he was in a lot of trouble, and, you 
know, it was basically -- it was better for him to be honest 
and let me know what was going on. And he initially denied, 
again, that he was involved in any kind of distribution issue 
at the scene, but eventually he did make some incriminating 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
statements. 
Q Now, let me ask you real quick. Did you take any 
written statements from any of the people while you were at the 
scene? 
A I did. 
Q And who was that from? 
A Ms. Ruesch specifically. 
Q Did you inform Mr. Lamoreaux that you had a written 
statement? 
A I did. He was actually right there when she was 
actually writing it out. 
Q Okay. So when you were discussing this with him at 
the jail, he knew there was this statement? 
A Yeah, he saw her writing it out. 
Q Okay. You mentioned after you advised him that it 
might be better for him to be honest and cooperate that he made 
some admissions. Will you describe what he said? 
A I will. Initially, he would --he kept asking me, 
Why am I here, why am I here? I -- I didn't do anything. You 
know, I wasn't involved in any of this. 
And then I would -- I told him, Tim, you know, I've 
got all this information. You know, just come clean and tell 
me -- tell me what's going on, you know. 
And at that point, according to my report, I 
indicated here -- if I can refer to that? 
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Q You can refer to it to refresh your memory, but 
please don't read from it. 
A Okay. He did admit that he was involved in making 
the arrangements to distribute methamphetamine. 
Q And did he use those words? 
A He probably did not use those specific words. 
Q Do you recall roughly what he said? 
A To -- to be honest, to the best of my recollection, 
I -- I can't recall his specific words, exactly what he said. 
Q How did he indicate to you that he had been involved? 
A He -- he eventually said, Yeah, you know, I -- you're 
right. 
Q Okay. And did he say anything else? 
A You know, to be honest, I can't remember exactly what 
he said after that. 
Q Okay. So did he say anything about making phone 
calls to Suzanne Ruesch? 
A Yes. 
Q What did he state? 
A He indicated to me initially that he was on his cell 
phone and that he had contacted Suzanne Ruesch. 
Q Did he state what the purpose of contacting her was? 
A To be honest, and it's not in my -- as far as I can 
see in my report. If I can refer to it real quick? 
Q That's fine. 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
A I don't see that I included in my report exactly what 
he mentioned in the phone call --or conversation. 
Q Okay. That's fine. 
Did he say anything about what you saw when you 
walked up? You said you saw him handing something to somebody. 
Did he say anything about that? 
A He did. He indicated that it wasn't what I thought 
it was, that he was actually only handing her a cell phone. 
Q Did he say why he was handing her a cell phone? 
Or let me back up. Did he say whose cell phone it 
was? 
A I can't remember if he -- if he said that it was 
actually his cell phone or whose cell phone it was. But he had 
it in his possession, and I -- I do believe that it was his 
cell phone. 
Q Okay. And did he say anything about what the 
conversation was about that he was having on the phone as he 
handed it to Ms. Ruesch? 
A If I remember right, I don't know that he actually 
told me what the conversation was initially that --as far as 
the cell phone. 
Q Okay. What about what he said indicated to you that 
he had been involved with this drug deal? 
A Let me refer to my report one more time, please. 
Q That's fine. 
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A Can I refer to my report and read that specifically? 
THE COURT: Well, it depends on whether or not 
there's an objection. Because he can utilize it for the 
purpose of refreshing his memory. 
MR. KING: Your Honor, I think the witness has 
testified that he doesn't have a memory of what was actually 
said. If he read from the report, he would simply be reading 
from the report, which would be hearsay. 
He's read the report. He's testified that he can't 
remember what was said. I would say that it's been shown that 
the report is not able to refresh his memory. Therefore, it 
would be inadmissible. 
THE COURT: I don't know. The next question is 
whether or not reading the report -- whether it does, in fact, 
refresh his memory. If it does, then he can make reference to 
it. If it doesn't, then he has no independent recollection as 
it relates to it and the objection would be sustained. 
MR. PERKINS: Okay. 
MR. PERKINS: Q. Does that report refresh your 
memory about what Mr. Lamoreaux said to you that night? 
A To be honest, no, it doesn't. 
Q Okay. Did Mr. Lamoreaux say anything about why he 
changed his stories, from initially denying any involvement and 
then admitting to you that he was involved? 
A Not that I recall. 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
Q Okay. When -- I'll reserve that question for a later 
point. 
MR. PERKINS: At this point I have no further 
questions. 
THE COURT: You may cross-examine. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. KING: 
Q Officer Sorensen, you say you interviewed 
Mr. Lamoreaux twice in the investigation of this; is that 
correct? 
A I believe that's how many times I interviewed him. 
Q Okay. When you interviewed him at the scene, you 
testified that you asked him what was going on; is that 
correct? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q You testified that he played innocent. But do you 
recall at this point if he told you a story as to what was 
going on in response to your question? 
A If he told me a story, I don't remember what that 
story would have been. 
MR. KING: I have no further questions. 
THE COURT: Very well. 
You may step down. Thank you very much. 
Next witness, please? 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
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MR. KING: Your Honor, I would move -- relative to 
the motion for a directed verdict, I'd also make a motion to 
strike from the record any testimony from the officer relative 
to Mr. Lamoreaux's confession. As he testified himself on the 
stand not only that he had no recollection of what was said, 
but also that reading the police report did not refresh his 
memory and he was not able to provide any testimony today 
independent from the police report as to what he independently 
recollected was said by my client. 
On that grounds, anything in the police report would 
be hearsay and cannot be relied upon by this Court. And 
without anybody here to testify as to an independent 
recollection of that, I don't believe there's any grounds to 
admit any evidence relative to that confession. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
First of all, let's address that. 
Respond, please. 
MR. PERKINS: Your Honor, I believe the record will 
reflect that Officer Sorensen testified categorically that he 
remembered Mr. Lamoreaux admitting to being involved in the 
arrangement of the distribution of methamphetamine. When I 
further asked for details on that, he was unable to recall 
speciEics. This was, however, six months ago, and police 
reports are often used to refresh memories about details. 
Officer Sorensen testified that he was unable to independently 
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recollect the details of what Mr. Lamoreaux said, but he was 
very clear and unequivocal about his knowledge to remember that 
Mr. Lamoreaux did admit involvement. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
I will deny the motion. An officer's report can be 
utilized for the purpose of refreshing memory. It is accurate 
that as to a number of details Officer Sorensen looked at his 
report and it did not refresh his memory. But he indicated 
those areas on the record which areas he had no independent 
recollection of and which he did. 
My recollection as it relates to the admission is as 
follows. He had no recollection of the exact wording that he 
said in connection with it, but he had made -- the officer had 
made some statement as it relates to his involvement. And his 
testimony was that Mr. Lamoreaux finally said "Right" or 
"Correct." There was an admission as it relates to the 
statement of the officer relative to Mr. Lamoreaux?s 
involvement with the drugs. 
As to the specifics beyond that, counsel, you are 
accurate that he was not able to refresh his memory from 
referral to the police report itself. But those areas were 
patently clear on the record and before the jury, so. 
MR. KING: So, if I may, Your Honor? For purposes of 
that testimony, are you finding that -- I guess what statements 
are you finding --
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THE COURT: Well, you can either --
MR. KING: -- that he did say he --
THE COURT: You can either make a record as it 
relates to the specificity. But if you're doing it generically 
in sort of a broad brush, then it's a denial relative to that. 
I think the record is absolutely clear that Officer Sorensen 
indicated on the record when and when not -- when the report 
refreshed his memory and when it did not. 
MR. KING: Very well, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And when it did and when he had an 
independent recollection, it may remain. That's my 
recollection. 
MR. KING: May I request from the Court if I may be 
able to obtain a copy of either the transcript or recording of 
that portion of the officer's testimony prior to closing so 
that I can appropriately go over what he remembered and did not 
remember. My notes --
THE COURT: You're going to have to rely on your 
notes. The court reporter's not going to be able to provide 
you with a transcript of this trial prior to closing, I don't 
believe. 
MR. KING: Okay. 
THE COURT: At the very least it would be a rough 
draft. 
MR. KING: Yeah. My notes indicated that he said 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
that he -- he could specifically state that he knew that 
Mr. Lamoreaux made some incriminating statements. But other 
than that, I haven't marked down that everything that --he 
couldn't recall an independent recollection as to anything 
specific beyond that incriminating statements were made. I 
don't know if my notes or my understanding of what took place 
was inaccurate, but that's what I recall and that's what my 
notes indicate. 
I guess my further question would be if the Court's 
memory is different, if counsel's memory is different, what am 
I allowed to argue in closing if my notes indicate --
THE COURT: You are able to argue from that position. 
I think your -- your position is accurate. He indicated my 
recollection of his testimony is that he claimed that your 
client made some incriminating statements. He could not 
testify as to the exact language of those incriminating 
statements, except for the fact that he said, quote, unquote, 
"Right" or "Correct." 
Now --
MR. PERKINS: Just for --
THE COURT: -- perhaps my recollection is inaccurate. 
I don't know. 
MR. PERKINS: Just for the record, my recollection 
also includes that Officer Sorensen stated very directly that 
his memory was that Mr. Lamoreaux admitted being involved in 
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the arranging and distribution of that. 
THE COURT: That was my recollection, though he 
doesn't -- that he could not state with any specificity the 
exact language that was stated by Mr. Lamoreaux, even upon 
referral to his police report. 
But, counsel, yes, you can obtain a rough draft, it 
won't be a certified copy, of the testimony of Officer 
Sorensen, and utilize that in connection with your closing, 
certainly. 
MR. KING: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: But it will be a rough draft, it won't be 
a certified copy. Okay? 
MR. KING: Understood. 
Relative to that, I would continue with my motion for 
a directed verdict, based on the fact that the testimony 
basically as to this incriminating testimony towards my client 
consists solely of the -- that incriminating statements were 
made without specificity as to what those were. 
And then Ms. Ruesch's testimony which I'm looking to 
show that the many areas where her testimony was inconsistent 
on the stand even with her own testimony. I can specifically 
point to the fact that she testified that she received a black 
bag from when she went to the Best Motel, and then testified 
that my client had thrown it into the vehicle. She testified 
that these statements were accurate, therefore, testifying that 
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she intended to give all the drugs to other people independent 
of my client. 
Also this statement she testified that it was 
accurate when she stated that he handed her the cell phone to 
talk with Rachel and Tim when the officer approached. But then 
contrary to that same testimony by stating that he had thrown 
the phone in or thrown the phone and the baggy in while they 
were speaking. 
I'd also point out that her testimony that my client 
gave her the phone and then was intending to leave, she called 
him back and gave him the phone. The officer's approach is 
wholly inconsistent with the testimony we received from the 
officer who testified that he saw my client handing her 
something when he approached, which is also inconsistent with 
any of her statements that my client threw something into the 
car at that time. 
Based on the fact that we have three statements that 
she gave prior to today where there are inconsistencies and her 
own -- her testimony today is concurrent with none of those 
statements and it's inconsistent with itself, I would ask this 
Court to find that her testimony is not testimony that a 
reasonable jury would be able to use in finding my client 
guilty. 
And with that, I'd submit it. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
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You may be heard, Mr. Perkins. 
MR. PERKINS: Your Honor, to survive the motion for a 
directed verdict, the State only needs to make a prima facie 
case. And it!s my contention that we've done that. We've 
heard Officer Sorensen testify that he arrested individuals, 
found methamphetamine, and took confessions from two of those 
people; Ms. Ruesch and Mr. Lamoreaux. 
Again, although Mr. -- or, excuse me, although 
Officer Sorensen's recollection was lacking in detail, it was 
clear in the sense that Mr. Lamoreaux had incriminated himself 
in the charges against him. 
Ms. Ruesch's testimony. The State actually expected 
it to be much more inconsistent than it turned out to be. Most 
of these inconsistencies actually turn out to be minor details 
that lawyers like to pick out and look at and hang their case 
on, myself included. I'm not disparaging Mr. King at all. I 
was intending to try to survive some of her inconsistencies 
with some of these minor details. But in the end I believe 
Ms. Ruesch is testifying about something that happened six 
months ago that was very emotional, probably very stressful for 
her as well. It's unlikely that she will recall the details as 
we like to parse them out looking at reports and going over a 
case months later. 
What I'm getting at is I don't think her testimony 
was so inconsistent that it's unbelievable. She corroborates 
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pretty much everything that Officer Sorensen testified to, and 
she also has implicated the defendant at least beyond the level 
of a prima facie case. 
THE COURT: Well, I'll deny the motion for a directed 
verdict. The State has established a prima facie case, 
acknowledging that there are inconsistencies in testimony. It 
goes to an issue of credibility. Issues of credibility go to 
the jury. And if there are internal inconsistencies in terms 
of her testimony today and external inconsistencies as it 
relates to prior statements, Mr. King can underscore those and 
highlight those before the jury at closing for as long as he 
wishes. So very well. 
Now, with that, denying the motion for a directed 
verdict, finding a prima facie case, and allowing issues of 
inconsistencies and testimony and issues of credibility to go 
to the jury, then where do we stand as it relates to the 
defense at this point in time? The State has rested. 
MR. KING: I think if I might have a few moments to 
discuss that with my client --
THE COURT: Very well. 
MR. KING: -- especially relative to whether or not 
he will take the stand. 
THE COURT: We will take a short break, give you that 
opportunity to see whether you anticipate calling him or any 
witnesses or whether you would rest at this time. Thank you. 
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zone. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. PERKINS: And I --
THE COURT: Then we'll leave that language there and 
we will simply modify and strike paragraphs 1 through 9 in the 
description of what a drug free zone is. Okay. 
Well, I think with that modification we are ready, 
then, to make copies. 
Anything further, counsel? 
MR. KING: Your Honor, I wanted to -- if I might 
clarify. Based on my motion and our discussion of Officer 
Sorensen's testimony, testimony relative to his independent 
recollection versus the hearsay from the report. On reviewing 
his testimony, he stated -- basically, as I had said prior, 
that he said in that interview he made some incriminating 
statements, and then he was asked what those statements were. 
His next reply was, According to the report, he admitted that 
he was involved in arranging to distribute. 
Then when asked specifically what he said that 
indicated that he had been involved in that, the only thing 
that he could independently recollect was a comment of "You're 
right.» 
I would just ask that either the jury be instructed 
relative to that, or that at least we be instructed in our 
closing to only make reference to the two comments that he made 
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incriminating statements, and that the statement was "You're 
right." 
THE COURT: Well, I think you can comment -- you have 
leave, of course, to comment as it relates to the testimony. 
Whatever the testimony is is what you're restricted to. So 
however that plays out is how you're going to argue. 
MR. KING: My concern is that if the jury is left 
with the impression that his statement that the report said 
that he admitted to being involved in arranging to distribute, 
that they would take that as evidence. Where, in fact, I think 
the rules imply that that could not be evidence unless it was 
verified by an independent recollection which he could not do. 
THE COURT: You can respond to that, counsel. 
MR. PERKINS: No, I would disagree with that. I 
believe his testimony was that he did have an independent 
recollection of the defendant incriminating himself but he was 
not able to recall with that independent recollection specific 
details about the language the defendant used. 
THE COURT: That's my understanding, and I think 
that's how you argue it to the jury on both sides. 
I mean, you have the transcript, correct? 
MR. KING: I don't have the transcript, but I did 
review the audio --
THE COURT: Oh, okay. 
MR. KING: -- recording. 
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THE COURT: So what is your request to the Court? 
MR. KING: My specific request is that his statement 
where he said, According to the report he made, he admitted 
being involved in arranging to distribute, that that statement 
not be allowed -- that there be an instruction from the Court 
to the jury that that statement should not be considered as 
evidence in this case. 
Whereas the rest of his testimony relative to his 
independent recollection, I think, would be admissible. But 
that specific statement where he said, According to the report, 
and basically he then read a sentence from the report which 
report we have established would be hearsay, whereas it has not 
been supported by an independent recollection. 
MR. PERKINS: When he made that statement, my -- he 
was not reading from the report. In fact, if we reviewed the 
police report now, there is no statement in the report that he 
admitted to being involved in arranging to distribute 
methamphetamine. There are other statements specific --
THE COURT: I'm going to simply allow you to comment 
as it relates to your impressions of how he testified. I don't 
have a transcript before me, I haven't heard the audio, but I 
do have an independent recollection of how he testified 
yesterday. And I think it just goes to the weight. And that's 
how I will rule. 
MR. KING: Thank you, Your Honor. 
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